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THE UNWELCOME COHORT: WHEN THE
SENTENCING JUDGE INVADES YOUR BEDROOM
Elizabeth M. Bux*
INTRODUCTION
Every convict knows that if you do the crime, you must do the
time. But what exactly can the government force you to do to "do the
time"? It is clear that people who are incarcerated, on parole, and on
probation are subject to restrictions that limit their rights, even those
rights protected by the Constitution.' These invasions can be obvious
safety provisions, such as denying the right to carry a gun in prison, or
restrictions to prevent future infractions, such as mandatory rehabili-
tation programs. Although these provisions are intrusive, they are
fairly straightforward and generally accepted; however, some restric-
tions are not so obviously within the government's power.
For most Americans, the decision whether to have a child is
between them, their partners, and the powers that be; however, in a
number of recent cases, courts have begun to restrict the right to pro-
create as it applies to those people who have been convicted of certain
offenses relating to their children, namely failing to pay child support.
One such case is State v. Talty,2 in which an Ohio man was sentenced
to make reasonable efforts not to have another child as part of the
conditions of his probation for failing to support several of his chil-
dren.3 This sentence raises several issues relating to civil liberties in
criminal sentencing and begs the question: Just how far into one's
personal life can the courts go?
* Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2010; B.A., Economics &
Political Science, Ohio State University, 2007. I would like to thank my father for
helping me find my topic, Judge Kimbler for helping me understand the situation
and allowing me to interview him, Professors Jennifer Mason McAward and Rick
Garnett for helping me with my research, and the staff of the Notre Dame Law Review
for editing this Note.
1 See discussion infra Part II.C.
2 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004).
3 Id. at 1202.
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This Note discusses the various issues of civil rights and criminal
law associated with the sentence in the Talty case and those issues that
might arise from similar sentences. Part I outlines the facts and his-
tory unique to the Talty case. Part II discusses the privacy issues at
play in a sentence dealing with procreation and sexuality. This Part
explains the procreative rights involved in cases of sterilization, birth
control, and abortion, and fleshes out the issues of privacy involved in
cases of nonprocreative sexuality. In addition, this Part illustrates the
various limits on privacy inherent in a criminal conviction, along with
the ramifications that such limits have on the constitutionality of gov-
ernmental restrictions on behavior.
Part III of the Note discusses the fundamental right to marriage
and how it might affect the strength of privacy and procreative rights.
Part IV illustrates the various issues involved with requiring birth con-
trol in a setting in which such an order contradicts religious teachings.
Additionally, Part IV discusses generally the Free Exercise Clause and
elaborates on the hybrid rights exception. Ultimately, this Note con-
cludes that courts are allowed to restrict procreative rights in criminal
sentencing except in cases where the right to free exercise of religion
is used in combination with the fundamental right to marry.
I. CASE FACTS AND HISTORY
On February 27, 2002, Sean E. Talty, a resident of Medina
County, Ohio, was indicted for failing to pay child support for three of
his seven biological children.4 Mr. Talty initially pled not guilty to the
charges, but eventually changed his plea to no contest.5 The trial
court accepted the plea and requested that each side prepare a brief
regarding whether or not a court is permitted to order a convicted
criminal to not impregnate a woman while on probation if such an
order is reasonably related to his offense, as it was in that case.6 Briefs
from both sides were considered as was a brief filed by the American
Civil Liberties Union of Ohio, which supported the position that such
a restriction could not be imposed.7 In ajournal entry dated Septem-
ber 6, 2002, Judge James L. Kimbler of the Medina County Court of
Common Pleas sentenced Mr. Talty to five years of community control
4 Id. at 1202.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Ohio Foundation
in Support of Appellant Sean Talty, Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (No. 03-1344), 2004 WL
5284056 [hereinafter ACLU Brief].
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and nonresidential sanctions,8 which included basic supervision by
the Adult Probation Department, and further ordered that Mr. Talty
"make all reasonable efforts to avoid conceiving another child."9
Mr. Talty appealed this decision to the Ninth District Court of
Appeals, claiming that the part of the sentence requiring him to avoid
having children violated his Due Process and Equal Protection rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and vari-
ous sections of the Ohio Constitution.' 0 The Ninth District upheld
the trial court's decision, stating that the sanction was constitutional."
The Court used the three prong test from State v. Jones,12 which
requires that sanctions: (1) be reasonably related to the offender's
rehabilitation, (2) have some relationship to the crime which the
offender was convicted of, and (3) serve the ends of the probation by
relating to criminal conduct or conduct related to future criminality.13
Although the court acknowledged that there is a fundamental right to
procreate, it refused to review the case under strict scrutiny, stating
that conditions of probation are not subject to such a strict analysis.14
The Ohio Supreme Court overturned the sentence on September
29, 2004, stating that the antiprocreation order was overbroad.15 The
Court focused on the fact that the order did not allow the antiprocrea-
tion sanction to be lifted if Mr. Talty were to become current on his
child support payments.' 6 Although the Court did not address the
issue of the constitutionality of the sentence, it did state that the right
to procreate is fundamental under the U.S. Constitution.' 7
Before the case was remanded to the trial court, Mr. Talty mar-
ried his live-in girlfriend, who also is the mother of two of his chil-
8 SeeOHio REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2929.01(E), 2929.15 (West 2009) (defining a com-
munity control sanction and describing its application). These sections state that this
form of sanction does not involve a prison term; however, it requires that the felon
obtain permission from the court before leaving the jurisdiction and allows the court
to impose other conditions on release that the court deems appropriate. Id.
9 Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1202; see also ACLU Brief, supra note 7, at 2 (identifying
Judge Kimbler as the trial judge). Mr. Talty was also required to make regular child
support payments, remain employed, and receive his GED within five years. See State
v. Talty, 2003 Ohio App. 3d 3161, 1 4 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003).
10 Talty, 2003 Ohio App. 3d 3161, 1 5.
11 Id. 1 27.
12 550 N.E.2d 469 (Ohio 1990).
13 Id. at 470.
14 Talty, 2003 Ohio App. 3d at 11 16-18.
15 Talty, 814 N.E.2d at 1207.
16 Id. at 1205.
17 Id. at 1203.
2010] 747
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
dren.18 When the conditions of his probation were again before
Judge Kimbler, the Court held that the antiprocreation sanction
could not be imposed on Mr. Talty. The reason for this was that Mr.
Talty was a married man, and such an order would interfere with the
fundamental right to marriage.19
II. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy has been considered a fundamental right
ever since the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.2 0 This basic right was expanded and strengthened in subsequent
cases, most notably Roe v. Wade2 and Lawrence v. Texas.2 2 The right to
privacy covers two main areas that apply to the Talty case: the right to
make procreative decisions and the right to privacy in sexual behavior.
Sections A and B discuss procreative rights and sexuality, respectively.
Section C discusses how a criminal conviction affects the right to pri-
vacy and whether or not that consideration will override the Four-
teenth Amendment problems.
A. Privacy in Procreative Rights
Regulating procreative rights is neither a new concept nor lim-
ited in its potential intrusion. This section illustrates the various ways
in which the government has tried to regulate procreation in the past
and what it has the potential to do in the future.
1. Sterilization
The Talty decision, along with other recent cases such as State v.
Oakley,23 is not the first case to deal with the issue of government
restriction on procreation. In the 1920s, the Court was called upon to
18 Ostensibly, the court vacated its previous order for this reason. See Re-Sentenc-
ing Judgment Entry, State v. Talty, No. 02-CR-0075 (Medina County, Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl. Nov. 24, 2004).
19 Interview with James L. Kimbler, Judge, Medina County Court of Common
Pleas, in Medina, Ohio (Oct. 20, 2008).
20 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). The Court lists several possible sources for the
right within the U.S. Constitution, namely the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth
Amendments. Id.
21 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For further discussion of Roe, see infra Part II.A.2.
22 539 U.S. 558 (2003). For further discussion of Lawrence, see infra Part II.B.
23 629 N.W.2d 200, 212 (Wis. 2001) (creating, for a man who was delinquent in
his child support payments, a term of probation that he avoid having more children
unless he could show that he was able to support them).
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address the sterilization movement.24 The sterilization movement
began in 1883 with the concept of eugenics, which was developed by
an English scientist named Francis Galton, and which promoted steril-
izing the "dim-witted" or "feeble-minded" during their reproductive
years, so as to prevent the "defective" people from genetically passing
their faults to an increasingly large portion of the population.25 The
fear among the supposedly nondefective people was that they would
be outnumbered and brought to ruin by the masses of the "unfit."26
States began imposing laws that required that certain people be steril-
ized against their will in cases of mental incapacity, physical deformity,
or conviction. 27 This movement grew in popularity and even had an
advocate on the Supreme Court in Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,
who famously stated in Buck v. Bel 28 that "[three generations of
imbeciles are enough."29
Buck was the first major case to deal with this issue. The case
involved a woman who was sterilized under a Virginia statute because
she was institutionalized and had hereditary "imbecility."30 The Court
upheld this statute and procedure, stating that the State could legiti-
mately require sterilization because it was necessary to the public wel-
fare and did not violate the Due Process Clause.3 1 In his opinion for
the court, Justice Holmes summarized the purpose for the law by say-
ing, "It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute
degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecil-
ity, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing
24 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 5 (1995); see also
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 542-43 (1942) (addressing the forced steriliza-
tion of a convicted felon); Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207-08 (1927) (addressing the
forced sterilization of a "feeble-minded," institutionalized woman).
25 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 5.
26 Id.
27 Julius Paul, State Eugenic Sterilization History: A Brief Overview, in EUGENIC STERIL-
IZATION 25, 31 (Jonas Robitscher ed., 1973); see also RobertJ. Cynkar, Buck v. Bell:
"Felt Necessities" v. Fundamental Values?, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1418, 1428 (1981) (explain-
ing that the negative eugenics movement involved "efforts to eradicate the socially
inadequate germ-plasm from the American stock"); A. Felecia Epps, Unacceptable Col-
lateral Damage: The Danger ofProbation Conditions Restricting the Right to Have Children, 38
CREIGHTON L. REv. 611, 647-52 (2005) (noting that Skinner and Buck were decided
against a social backdrop of general acceptance of eugenics).
28 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
29 Id. at 207; see also LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 14 (characterizing
Holmes's statement as "infamous" and noting that it engendered heated controversy).
30 Buck, 274 U.S. at 205-06. The statute left great deference to the superintend-
ents of the various facilities, giving them the sole discretion over who would be
brought before the review board. Id.
31 Id. at 207-08.
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their kind."32 Justice Holmes's opinion seems to support the notion
that the government had a legitimate purpose in controlling the
reproduction of the unfit, even likening the sterilization procedures
to compulsory vaccinations.33 This decision has been strongly criti-
cized and is currently not followed, despite never being overruled.34
The Buck decision appears to lend support to the sentence in
Talty. The argument that it is better for Mr. Talty not to have any
more children than to have children that he cannot support, and who
will thus be dependent on society for support, traces Holmes's argu-
ment that it is better to stop the conception of potentially unfit people
than to allow them to become a burden on society. Although these
arguments seem similar, the decision in Talty has a far more direct
link to criminal prevention, as it was clear that Mr. Talty was not likely
to support additional children in the near future. The Buck decision
is far more concerned with preventing a general population of poten-
tial criminals from being born, while the Talty decision is concerned
primarily with the recidivism of one particular offender, as is required
when creating terms of probation under Jones.35
Although the reasoning of the Buck decision would more than
likely support the sentence in Talty on grounds of societal interest, in
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson36 the Court invalidated a statute
which used the same eugenics argument as Buck for the sterilization
of habitual criminals, thus discrediting that line of reasoning.37 The
statute, known as the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act,3 8
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
by requiring involuntary sterilization for persons convicted of certain
"'felonies involving moral turpitude,"' while neglecting to impose the
sentence on persons who committed other crimes, particularly white
collar crimes such as embezzlement.39 The Court emphasized the
32 Id. at 207. Sadly, the Nazis used this argument during World War II as support
for their "'elimination of the unfit."' See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 16-17
(quoting Dr. Bell).
33 Buck, 274 U.S. at 207.
34 See LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 17 (stating that some critics referred to
Holmes as a "monster" for his decision in Buck (internal quotation marks omitted));
Epps, supra note 27, at 650 (noting that although Buck is not currently followed, it
cleared the way for compulsory sterilization of 60,000 mentally disabled people).
35 See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
36 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
37 Id. at 536, 541-43.
38 OKLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, art. 2, § 5044 (Harlow Supp. 1940), invalidated by
Skinner, 316 U.S. 535.
39 See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536, 541-43 (quoting OLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 26, art. 2,
§ 5044).
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arbitrary nature of the distinction between crimes and left the door
open for sterilization of those offenders whose crimes were related to
procreation, although the opinion did invalidate the removal of pro-
creative ability from habitual criminals without a more stringent
justification.40
Although courts, and more importantly the public, have refused
to support mandatory sterilization, it does not necessarily follow from
these decisions that a mandate to use "reasonable efforts to avoid con-
ceiving another child" would be invalid. The sentence in Talty is nar-
rowly tailored and is an effort to prevent a particular person, not his
offspring, from committing a habitual crime related directly to that
conception, as opposed to an amorphous law that claimed to be in the
name of prevention, but which had the potential to be used widely to
discriminate based on race and poverty.41 Even though the probation
condition in Talty appears to survive this line of reasoning, these are
not the only cases that define the scope of protection for procreative
rights.
2. Birth Control and Abortion
Protection of procreative rights did not really take hold until the
right to privacy gained prevalence in the United States. With the deci-
sion in Griswold, the Supreme Court recognized a fundamental right
to privacy in procreative decisions, namely the use of contraceptives by
married couples.4 2 This idea was later expanded to unmarried people
in the decision of Eisenstadt v. Baird,43 which struck down a Massachu-
setts law that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives to unmar-
ried persons.4 4  The Court in Eisenstadt held that the statute
"violate[d] the rights of single persons under the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."4 5 The Court reasoned that
the right to privacy creates a right to use birth control, and that the
government's contention that regulation of this activity protected the
40 Id. at 540 (stating that the state may "confin [e] 'its restrictions to those classes
of cases where the need is deemed to be clearest'" (quoting Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S.
373, 384 (1915))).
41 Id. at 540-42 ("In evil or reckless hands it can cause races or types which are
inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear.").
42 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (stating that the idea of
government intervention into marital beds is "repulsive to the notions of privacy sur-
rounding the marriage relationship"). In this case, the Court struck down a law which
made it illegal for married couples to use birth control and prosecuted doctors for
advising or assisting patients with the practice. Id. at 485.
43 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
44 Id. at 440-43.
45 Id. at 443.
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public from potential danger did not hold water if some members of
the population were allowed to use it unfettered by regulation. 46 The
Court equated procreative freedom with the right to privacy, stating,
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intru-
sion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."47 It is clear from these remarks that
the Court considered the right to procreation to be fundamental.
The right to make procreative decisions was extended beyond the
basic use of birth control by the 1973 landmark decision Roe.48 By
ruling that the right to privacy encompassed the right of a woman to
obtain an abortion, with certain governmental restrictions, the Court
ensured that procreative decisions would be within a protected
"zone[ ] of privacy" that must be respected under the Constitution.49
It is clear that Roe, and subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court,
such as Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,50
uphold the constitutional "limits on a State's right to interfere with a
person's most basic decisions about family and parenthood."5 ' How-
ever, as the decision in Casey suggests, the right to privacy in procrea-
tive decisions is not absolute.52
It follows from these cases that the fundamental right to privacy
in birth control decisions applies to all people. If this right were taken
to its logical conclusion, it would imply that the right not to use birth
control would also be fundamental. Because the government cannot
infringe on the fundamental rights of its citizens unless the infringe-
ment passes strict scrutiny, any condition mandating birth control
would not be constitutional without necessity and a compelling
purpose.
3. How Privacy Plays into the Talty Sentence
One obvious question that arises from the sentence in Talty is:
What are "reasonable efforts"? There is no evidence to indicate that
46 Id. at 450-52.
47 Id. at 453.
48 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973) (defining a right to abortion within a
trimester framework).
49 Id. at 152-54.
50 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
51 Id. at 849 (upholding some governmental restrictions on abortion while main-
taining its protected status under the right to privacy in procreative decisions).
52 Id. at 869, 877 (stating that abortion may be restricted by the states when there
exists a sufficient interest in the life of the child and upholding regulations that
require parental or judicial consent for minors and have a reporting requirement).
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the court would consider sterilization to be a mandatory reasonable
effort. It is also not reasonable to require that any children conceived
by the convicted criminal be aborted, especially in cases where the
perpetrator is a man, as the right to choose belongs to the mother
alone.53 It appears a logical conclusion that the Medina County, Ohio
Court of Common Pleas meant for Mr. Talty to use some form of birth
control. As we see in Griswold and Eisenstadt, the right to use birth
control falls under the right to privacy and cannot be restricted by the
government without a compelling reason;54 and it follows that the
right to choose not to use birth control would fall under the same
exception. The sentence in question must be able to overcome this
fundamental right by showing a sufficient state interest under normal
circumstances. Were this sentence a blanket rule, it is clear that it
would not pass constitutional muster. But this is not the entire story,
and many other factors weigh on the ultimate constitutionality of the
sentence.
B. Privacy in Sexuality
Although the procreative aspect of the sentence in Talty figures
prominently in its constitutionality, the concept of privacy in sexual
behavior is also an important issue. This seemingly relevant concept
was not raised by any of the courts hearing the case; despite the media
attention drawn to the issue due to the Court's decision in Lawrence,
only days after the Ninth District Court of Appeals heard Talty,5 5 the
Supreme Court of Ohio failed to even touch on the issue.56
The Lawrence decision impacts the issue in Talty in two ways.
First, it reinforces the proposition that the right to privacy extends
beyond procreative sexual activity.5 7 Second, it emphasizes the idea
that the government does not have the right to interfere in the con-
53 Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (referring only to "a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy" (emphasis added)).
54 See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text.
55 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003). For explanation of the Law-
rence decision, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
56 State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004) (making no mention of privacy in
sexual behavior).
57 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("'[I]ndividual decisions by married persons, con-
cerning the intimacies of their physical relationship, even when not intended to pro-
duce offspring are a form of 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this protection extends to intimate choices by
unmarried as well as married persons.'" (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting))).
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sensual sexual behavior of adults except in extreme cases.5 8 With this
ruling in mind, the question becomes: Is a sanction that requires a
"reasonable effort" to avoid pregnancy overly intrusive into one's sex-
ual activity outside the realm of procreation?
In order to analyze fully this area of law, it is necessary to begin
with the Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick.5 9 Bowers arose out of
the prosecution of a Georgia man found to be practicing sodomy in
violation of a state statute criminalizing the practice.60 The Court
upheld the law, finding that it did not violate the Constitution because
there was no fundamental right for homosexuals to engage in sexual
activity. 61 Additionally, the Court held that a "presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable" provided an adequate rational basis for
the law. 62
The decision in Bowers stood for almost two decades before it was
overturned in Lawrence. In Lawrence, the Court struck down a Texas
statute making homosexual sodomy a crime, stating that it violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.6 3  The Court
found that "our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, child rearing, and education."64 The Supreme
Court's reading of the Fourteenth Amendment created a broad pri-
vacy right for sexual behavior that is in no way tied to efforts to pro-
duce offspring. Additionally, the Court made it clear that the
protection applies to the states as well as the federal government.65
Although the courts in Talty did not address the right to privacy
in sexual behavior, it is a relevant factor in the constitutionality of the
sentence. It is clear that a requirement to use birth control, or to
abstain from sex altogether, would directly interfere with the private
sexual activities of consenting adults. Even though such interference
is not an absolute bar, as was the issue in Bowers and Lawrence, the
Supreme Court's holding in Lawrence was sufficiently expansive that it
58 Id. at 567 (stating that the right to privacy "should counsel against attempts by
the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects").
59 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
60 Id. at 187-88.
61 Id. at 189-90.
62 Id. at 196.
63 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 578.
64 Id. at 574 (citation omitted); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that those matters involving "choices central to per-
sonal dignity and autonomy" are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).
65 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 578.
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could reasonably be applied to less than complete restrictions. Under
the standard set forth in Lawrence, it appears that the Talty sentence
would violate the right to privacy. However, there is an important dif-
ference between these two situations: Mr. Talty was convicted of a
crime independent from his sexual behavior and Mr. Lawrence's
criminal charges were based on his sexual behavior as a private citi-
zen. 66 As the next section illustrates, convicted criminals do not enjoy
the same privacy rights as other citizens.
C. Rights of Convicted Criminals: How Much of Their
Privacy Is Fofeited?
If it is true that requiring a person not to have children violates
the Fourteenth Amendment for the reasons listed above, how does his
status as a convicted criminal change his privacy rights? And if convic-
tion does change these rights, does it allow for enough restriction to
overcome the presumed right to have children?
Common sense would suggest that privacy rights are changed by
a conviction. A convicted criminal can be imprisoned as punishment
for a crime and almost every aspect of his life can be restricted.6 7
Many fundamental rights, such as freedom of association, are com-
pletely regulated.68 When dealing with a convicted criminal who is
incarcerated, it is necessary for the safety of the officers and other
inmates involved, as well as for the purposes of incarceration, that the
prison be able to restrict rights when necessary.69 Despite the lack of
rights in prisons, conviction does not mean that a person's rights are
automatically forfeited. 70
66 Id. at 564.
67 See Sara C. Busch, Note, Conditional Liberty: Restricting Procreation of Convicted
Child Abusers and Dead Beat Dads, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 479, 500 (2005) ("[A] regula-
tion may infringe on a prisoner's right if the right in question is inherently inconsis-
tent with incarceration.").
68 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment's "probable cause" standard for warrants could be replaced by "reasona-
ble grounds" in the search of a probationer's home); Elaine E. Sutherland, Procreative
Freedom and Convicted Criminals in the United States and the United Kingdom: Is Child Wel-
fare Becoming the New Eugenics?, 82 OR. L. REv. 1033, 1036 (2003) ("It is in the nature
of incarceration that an individual's freedom is restricted.").
69 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 547 (1979) ("Prison administrators therefore
should be accorded wide-ranging deference in the adoption and execution of policies
and practices that in their judgment are needed to preserve internal order and disci-
pline and to maintain institutional security.").
70 Id. at 545 ("[C]onvicted persons do not forfeit all constitutional protections by
reason of their conviction and confinement in prison."). But see O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348, 353 (1987) (holding that even where First Amendment
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It is not surprising that these rights would be restricted. "Loss of
freedom of choice and privacy are inherent incidents of confinement
in [a prison]."71 There is almost no right to privacy in a prison,
despite the fact that the right to privacy is fundamental. For example,
packages sent to a prisoner can be searched and some items may be
banned regardless of the privacy rights.7 2 The Supreme Court held in
Turner v. Safley7 3 that prisons can infringe on an inmate's constitu-
tional rights so long as the restriction is "reasonably related to legiti-
mate penological interests."74 This type of monitoring would most
likely pass the Court's strict scrutiny test, were it applied, because pub-
lic safety is a compelling governmental interest and monitoring is the
most basic and least intrusive way to secure prisons.75
The courts of Ohio have explicitly stated that those persons con-
victed of criminal offenses and on probation do not retain the same
degree of freedom with regards to constitutional rights as noncon-
victed persons.76 Probation, like parole, is an alternative to imprison-
ment that relies on certain conditions being met; there is no
constitutional or basic right to probation or parole.77 Although pro-
bation and parole necessarily give the convicted person more free-
doms than an institutional setting, the "defendant is still subject to
limitations."7 8 When determining if such limitations are constitu-
tional, the State of Ohio requires only that the sentence meet the stan-
dards set forth in the Jones decision.79 Strict scrutiny will not attach
even if the sanction infringes on a fundamental right.80 Jones created
a three-pronged test, requiring that all parole sanctions: (1) reasona-
religious exercise claims were made, the Court would not substitute its judgment for
that of prison officials).
71 Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 537.
72 Id. at 550-55.
73 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
74 Id. at 89.
75 Cf id. at 90-91 ("[P]rison officials do not have to set up and then shoot down
every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional
complaint.").
76 See, e.g., State v. Benton, 695 N.E.2d 757, 759, 763 (Ohio 1998) (holding that a
parolee's consent, as a condition of parole, to random warrantless searches waives his
constitutional rights).
77 Id. at 759-60 ("[A] convicted criminal has no inherent or constitutional right
to be conditionally released before the expiration of a validly imposed sentence.").
78 Id. at 759.
79 State v. Conkle, 717 N.E.2d 411, 412 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) ("As long as a condi-
tion .. . meets [the Jones test], the imposition of the condition is not grounds for
reversal."). For explanation of the Jones decision, see supra notes 12-13 and accompa-
nying text.
80 Conkle, 717 N.E.2d at 412.
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bly relate to offender rehabilitation; (2) have some relationship to the
crime that the offender is on probation for; and (3) relate to criminal
conduct or conduct related to future criminality, and thus serve the
ends of the probation."' This standard is not terribly difficult to meet
and does not ensure that the probationer's fundamental rights are
protected from governmental control in cases where the sanction and
the crime are sufficiently related.
Conditions of parole do not necessarily create the same immedi-
ate safety interest as conditions of imprisonment; however, convicted
criminals who do not receive jail time may still be restricted in many
areas of their behavior.82 Drug and alcohol use may be monitored,83
travel may be regulated, 84 and even freedom from warrantless
searches may be curtailed. 5 Despite these widely accepted restric-
tions, it is still unclear that procreative rights may be limited in the
same way as other privacy rights.
The issue of limiting procreation as a condition of probation is
not new, particularly in the State of Ohio. In State v. Livingston, 6 the
Sixth District Court of Appeals struck down a provision requiring an
unmarried woman not to have another child for the five years that she
was on probation for child abuse.87 Ms. Livingston was a mentally
handicapped woman who had set her child down on a space heater,
causing burns.88 In striking down the provision, the Court empha-
sized that conditions of probation cannot be overly burdensome on
the probationer. 89 The opinion does not suggest that all restrictions
on probation are overly restrictive, but that the restriction in this case
created an undue burden, as Ms. Livingston was more than likely
pregnant when she was sentenced.90
Despite the outcome of Livingston, procreative rights for the
criminally convicted are far from certain. In fact, case law from vari-
ous parts of the country indicates that procreative rights are not pro-
81 State v. Jones, 550 N.E.2d 469, 470 (1990).
82 Benton, 695 N.E.2d at 759.
83 See OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.15 (West 2009).
84 See id.
85 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872 (1987) (holding that a probationer's
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated by a warrantless search); see also Benton,
695 N.E.2d at 763 (holding that a similar warrantless search of a parolee are
constitutional).
86 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976).
87 Id. at 1336.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 1337.
90 Id. at 1336.
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tected for those individuals who are incarcerated.9 1 Several cases
across differing jurisdictions have rejected the concept of a right to
conjugal visits,92 while others have struck down inmate requests for
artificial insemination.93 In a recent case from the Ninth Circuit, an
en banc court held that "the right to procreate while in prison is fun-
damentally inconsistent with incarceration." 94 The Court reasoned
that the right to privacy was necessarily abridged by incarceration and,
therefore, those rights that are attached to privacy are "'necessarily
and substantially abridged"' as well. 95
Although it appears that it is possible to limit procreative rights
for those persons who are in prison, it is not clear that these limita-
tions are allowed when the most obvious barriers to procreation are
removed. There has been no definitive solution to this situation, and
the courts that have addressed the issue remain split. A Florida court
found in Rodriguez v. State 6 that a condition on probation for child
abuse that required a woman not to procreate violated her right to
privacy and was not sufficiently related to the crime to overcome the
presumption of invalidity.97 However, the Oregon Court of Appeals
took the opposite view in State v. Kline,98 holding that a limit on pro-
creation was a reasonable condition of probation in the case of child
mistreatment.99
91 Sutherland, supra note 68, at 1039-40 ("[U]ntil recently in the United States,
the suggestion that prisoners have any constitutional right to either conjugal visits or
access to artificial insemination had been denied consistently." (footnotes omitted)).
92 See, e.g., Hernandez v. Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1994); Anderson v. Vas-
quez, 28 F.3d 104 (9th Cir. 1994); Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080 (9th Cir.
1986).
93 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 1990); Percy v. N.J. Dep't
of Corr., 651 A.2d 1044 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
94 Gerber v. Hickman (Gerber I), 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
This narrow decision prevented Mr. Gerber, who was serving a life sentence, from
having a sperm sample sent to artificially inseminate his wife. Id. at 619, 624. This
case was denied certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. Gerber I, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1039 (2002).
95 Gerber I, 291 F.3d at 621 (quoting Hernandez, 18 F.3d at 137).
96 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
97 Id. at 10 ("The conditions relating to marriage and pregnancy have no rela-
tionship to the crime of child abuse . . . ." (footnotes omitted)); see also People v.
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984) (striking down a procreation condi-
tion of probation by holding that any condition which involves a fundamental right
deserves "special scrutiny").
98 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
99 Id. at 699.
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The Wisconsin case State v. Oakley'00 most closely resembles the
situation in Talty. In this case, Mr. Oakley was convicted of nonsup-
port of his nine children and ordered to avoid having more children
until he could show that he was able to support them.101 The
Supreme Court of Wisconsin upheld the sentence, stating that "the
condition [was] reasonably related to the goal of rehabilitation."l0 2
While courts remain unclear about probationers' right to procre-
ate, the sentence in the Talty case appears to be considered a reasona-
ble condition of probation in many jurisdictions. In Ohio specifically,
Talty seems to meet the standard set forth in Jones. The sanction of
not having additional children is reasonably related to the crime of
failing to pay child support and is likely to help prevent future crimes
of this type by the offender.103 Additionally, by helping to prevent
more financial burdens, the Court created the opportunity for Mr.
Talty to pay off some of his debts and thus rehabilitate himself. As the
courts tend to be more lenient on government intrusion into general
privacy rights of probationers and parolees, the specific procreation
concerns mentioned above are given less weight in order to meet the
goals of release, despite the holding in Pointer requiring special scru-
tiny in sentences involving fundamental rights. 0 4 Given courts' analy-
ses of issues of conviction and fundamental rights, it appears that the
sentence in the Talty case would pass constitutional muster.
III. MARRIAGE: DOEs THIS FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
CHANGE EVERYTHING?
Despite the fact that the Talty decision appears acceptable in
light of the limited privacy rights of convicted criminals, it still may
not be constitutional with respect to married people convicted of
crimes. There is a strong indication that marriage is a fundamental
right that cannot be infringed, even in the case of convicted
criminals.105 The U.S. Supreme Court clearly reserves a special place
100 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).
101 Id. at 201-02.
102 Id. at 213.
103 The record indicates that Mr. Talty was failing to pay his child support out of
financial difficulties, not malice or neglect. See Memorandum in Support ofJurisdic-
tion of Appellant Sean Talty at 3-4, State v. Talty, 814 N.E.2d 1201 (Ohio 2004) (No.
03-1344). The increase in his financial burden from additional children would almost
surely lead to recidivism.
104 See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Ct. App. 1984).
105 See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388 (1978) (striking down a Wisconsin
statute that required all noncustodial parents under a court order to support a child
to get permission from the court in order to marry); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
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in the legal realm for marriage, even stating that " [m]arriage is a com-
ing together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred."' 0 6 Because the ideas of marriage and
procreation are so connected, the question becomes: Does the right
to marry enhance the right to procreate? And if so, does that
enhanced privacy right overcome the interests of the state in restrict-
ing the conduct of convicted criminals?
"[T]he right to marry is part of the fundamental 'right of privacy'
implicit in the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause." 0 7
This concept of marriage has been supported for over a century,
beginning with the 1888 case Maynard v. Hill;108 however, that right
has been subject to state regulation for just as long.109 The fundamen-
tal right to marriage was most notably defended from state restriction
in Loving, in which the court struck down a Virginia law that, like the
laws of many other states at the time, prohibited marriage by interra-
cial couples. 10 The Court rejected the law because it could find "no
legitimate overriding purpose" for such an obviously discriminatory
restriction."'
In Griswold, the Supreme Court read the right to control procrea-
tion into the almost mythical right to marriage, and thus gave those
procreative decisions even more robust protection than other privacy
78, 96 (1987) (stating that there exists "a constitutionally protected marital relation-
ship in the prison context").
106 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
107 Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 384; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967)
("Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence
and survival." (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942))). The cruel irony of the statement in Loving is that the fundamental right to
marriage has been bypassed for homosexuals simply by narrowly defining the word
"marriage." See, e.g., Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 9 (N.Y. 2006) (holding that
while the "right to marry is unquestionably a fundamental right," the "right to marry
someone of the same sex ... is not 'deeply rooted'"). So while this right is vigorously
protected by courts, it is completely denied to an entire class of people, without suffi-
cient public interest to justify denial. See id. at 30-34 (Kaye, J., dissenting) (attacking
as invalid the various bases upon which the state asserts an interest).
108 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
109 Id. at 205 (emphasizing that the state "prescribes the age at which parties may
contract to marry, the procedure or form essential to constitute marriage, the duties
and obligations it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both, present and
prospective, and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution").
110 Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 ("Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed
by the State.").
111 Id. at 11.
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rights might be afforded.112 Although procreative rights have been
expanded to the unmarried,113 it is clear that the courts are much
more protective of the right to marry than the right to procreate.
When it comes to the rights of the incarcerated, the Supreme
Court has definitively extended the right to marriage to people in
prison. 114 "It is settled that a prison inmate 'retains those [constitu-
tional] rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or
with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections sys-
tem."' 115 Marriage is one of those rights; however, it is subject to
those restrictions that are necessary to incarceration.1 6 The Court in
Turner emphasized that certain aspects of marriage remain even dur-
ing incarceration, but the Court failed to list procreative rights within
those rights.117 As shown earlier in Part II, the right to procreate
while incarcerated is not guaranteed, even in the case of married
couples.118
When the case against Mr. Talty began, he was single and living
with his girlfriend who was the mother of two of his children. By the
time the Ohio Supreme Court reversed the sanction and remanded
the case to the trial court, Mr. Talty and his partner had gotten mar-
ried and Judge Kimbler removed the sanction.'" 9 Although this deci-
sion benefited Mr. Talty, there is no indication that the right to
marriage would provide more protection from government intrusion
than would the right to procreate alone. There have been no cases
that directly deal with this situation and it is difficult to tell which ele-
ments in combination would provide the most protection for a con-
victed criminal. It is obvious that more freedom is allotted to
probationers and parolees than inmates; however, the same funda-
112 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-86 (1965) ("We deal with a
right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights-older than our political parties, older
than our school system."). For more discussion on this case, see supra note 42 and
accompanying text.
113 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
114 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (stating that although marriages are
restricted, "[m]any important attributes of marriage remain"); Sutherland, supra note
68, at 1039 ("[T]he U.S. Supreme Court has concluded that prisoners retain another
fundamental right, the right to marry.").
115 Turner, 482 U.S. at 95 (alteration in original) (quoting Pell v. Procunier, 417
U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 95-96.
118 See Gerber v. Hickman (GerberI), 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc)
(upholding prison's refusal to allow an inmate to artificially inseminate his wife, with
whom he was not allowed personal visits).
119 See ACLU Brief, supra note 7, at 3.
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mental rights may be controlled in both situations, although to a
lesser degree. Whether the combination of conditional release over
incarceration, procreative rights, and marriage rights is enough to
overcome the legitimate governmental purpose of rehabilitating
habitually offending deadbeat dads remains a question for the courts.
IV. RELIGION: CAN THE STATE MANDATE BIRTH CONTROL AGAINST
CHURCH TEACHINGS?
As shown in the discussion above, there are many rights at play in
the Talty case that weigh on the constitutionality of the sentence.
Although the freedom of religion is not directly at issue in the case,
the concepts of birth control, procreation, marriage, and abortion can
scarcely be discussed without some reference to its impact.
Religion has often played a part in cases of procreative rights.
[T] he cutting edge of contemporary quarrels between religious com-
munities and individualism is with the right of privacy."120 It is clear
to many that the pro-life movement that has been so active since Roe
has a strong anchor in religious teachings. 121 In the past, religious
beliefs have helped to shape the law, even in the minds of individual
justices. For example, during the sterilization movement, many
believe that is wasJustice Butler's Catholic religious beliefs that caused
him to disfavor eugenics.122
Besides playing a role in judicial interpretations of what are
acceptable government actions, religion also plays an important role
in the interpretation of the term "reasonable" as it is used in the Talty
sentence. Indeed a defendant's religious beliefs may raise a number
of questions about the sentence imposed in Talty: What are "reasona-
ble efforts" not to conceive a child? Is it reasonable to require that a
person use birth control in order to avoid having more children, even
if his religion opposes it? Is it reasonable for someone who is not
allowed to use birth control to be required to abstain from sex? Does
the definition of "reasonable" vary based on a person's religious affili-
ation? Should it? Would a person who is not morally opposed to
abortion be required to have one to avoid violating the terms of her
parole? 23
120 David Rudenstine, Tolerance: the Bridge Between Religious Liberty and Privacy, 12
CARDozo L. REv. 821, 825 (1991).
121 See id. at 826 n.25 (stating that of the seventy-five amicus briefs filed in Webster
v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989), ten were filed by religious organiza-
tions supporting the restriction of abortion rights).
122 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 24, at 14-15.
123 This issue also raises the point that punishing a man for having a child may
lead to attacks on the woman whom he impregnates in an effort to avoid having the
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A. The Free Exercise Clause
In order to begin to answer these questions, we must first look at
what the right to religious freedom means. The first obvious source of
the right is in the First Amendment, which states, "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof . ."124 This clause ensures that citizens may
believe whatever they choose without government intervention. 2 5
Religion, however, is about more than beliefs; it often involves acts
that the faithful are called to do, or in many cases, abstain from
doing.126 Despite the fact that the Free Exercise Clause protects activi-
ties associated with religious observance, such protection is not abso-
lute.12 7 As Justice Scalia stated in Employment Division v. Smith,'28 "We
have never held that an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from
compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate." 29
To fully understand the law surrounding the Free Exercise
Clause, one must look at the history that led to the current standards
of enforcement. Before the Supreme Court's decision in Smith, courts
were expected to review all cases involving religious infringement
under the strict scrutiny standard.130 This meant that "[t]he govern-
ment could not make or enforce any law or policy that burdened the
exercise of a sincere religious belief unless it was the least restrictive
means of attaining a particularly important ('compelling') secular
objective."13 ' Although this standard sounds very protective of relig-
child in violation of the terms of his parole. This issue was not raised by Talty, as the
conception itself was the violation; however, it might be a problem in future cases and
prosecutions.
124 U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Exercise Clause was made binding on the
states by incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
125 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) ("The free exercise of
religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious
doctrine one desires.").
126 Id.
127 Id. at 878-79.
128 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
129 Id. at 878-79.
130 See Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); Ariana S. Cooper, Note, Free Exercise
Claims in Custody Battles: Is Heightened Scrutiny Required Post-Smith , 108 COLUM. L. REv.
716, 719 (2008) (-[A] number of pre-Smith cases had held that state action burdening
an individual's free exercise of religion was subject to strict scrutiny.").
131 Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1110 (1990).
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ion, Professor Michael McConnell indicates that this was not the case
in practice, and that "the Supreme Court only rarely sided with the
free exercise claimant, despite some very powerful claims."13 2
In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz13 3 and Turner v. Safley,13 4 the Court
established that the right to free exercise of religion survives incarcer-
ation.13 5 However, the right, like many other fundamental rights, is
limited in those situations in order to meet the goals of incarceration
and ensure safety. In those cases, "the Court established that a prison
regulation intruding on a prisoner's constitutionally protected rights
would be upheld only if such regulation was '[r]easonably related to
legitimate penological interests."' 1 3 6
This whole system changed in 1990 with the Smith decision. With
that decision, the Supreme Court scrapped the strict scrutiny standard
and held that when states make laws that are neutral with respect to
religion, yet happen to infringe on a particular religious practice, the
state is not required to create an exception to that law to allow for the
religious practice.' 3 7 This meant that when fort the benefit of any
state institution-for example, a penal institution-a state created a
law or regulation that impinged on a religious freedom, the affected
individual was generally not entitled to any concessions from that
institution to ensure his free exercise, so long as the regulation was
not motivated by religious discrimination on its face.
As a response to this decision, and in harsh criticism of it, Con-
gress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993138
(RFRA). RFRA was meant to overrule the Smith decision and "restore
the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate free exercise claims."139 Despite
132 Id. But cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972) (holding that enforce-
ment of a formal education requirement after eighth grade would prohibit free
exercise).
133 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (recognizing that a prisoner's right to freedom of
religion survives incarceration).
134 482 U.S. 78, 96 (1987) (recognizing the importance of respecting the religious
aspects of marriage).
135 O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 348 ("Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the
First Amendment, . . . including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exer-
cise of religion.").
136 Melissa R. Johnson, Note, Positive Vibration: An Examination of Incarcerated Ras-
tafarian Free Exercise Claims, 34 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 391, 403
(2008) (alteration in original) (quoting O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349).
137 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 883-90 (1990). In Smith, the Court
upheld an Oregon law making the use of peyote illegal despite its use in the sacra-
mental ceremonies of the Native American Church. Id.
138 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. (107 Stat.) 1488, invalidated by City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
139 Cooper, supra note 130, at 719.
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the public popularity of RFRA, state prison officials were less than
pleased, as they were inundated with lawsuits alleging burdens on
religion, most of which would have failed under any of the past stan-
dards. 140 These headaches were short-lived, however, because in 1997
the Supreme Court overturned RFRA with respect to the states in City
of Boerne v. Flores,141 saying that Congress had exceeded its authority in
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to effect remedial mea-
sures on the states. 14 2 With the decision in City of Boerne, the Court
reverted back to the Smith standard and allowed facially neutral laws
to burden religious beliefs.14 3
Despite this setback, Congress was not deterred. In 2000, Con-
gress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Actl 4 4 (RLUIPA), which promoted religious freedom for, among
other things, incarcerated criminals.14 5  "Congress passed this law
based on concerns that religious faith in prison was being hindered
and evidence that practicing religion promotes rehabilitation and
reduces recidivism."14 6 RLUIPA creates both a system for hearing
prisoners' claims of denial of free exercise of religion and a height-
ened standard of scrutiny for assessing those claims.147
While a convicted person is on probation or when he is released
on parole, most of his constitutional freedoms rebound from their
limited state to their usual protection. The right to free exercise of
religion is one of these rights: restrictions on activity and appearance
that might burden religious practices are lifted, and the probationer
or parolee is free to attend services at his local place of worship. How-
ever, there may be elements of probation that create religious con-
140 Johnson, supra note 136, at 404; see alsoJohn Gatliff, City of Boerne v. Flores
Wrecks RFRA: Searching for Nuggets Among the Rubble, 23 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 285, 306
(1999) (noting the burdensome number of lawsuits filed based on RFRA's "tougher
scrutiny" standard).
141 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
142 Id. at 534-35 ("RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely
to be unconstitutional because of their treatment of religion.").
143 Cooper, supra note 130, at 720 ("Thus, at least with respect to areas of law left
to the states, free exercise claims are protected by the Federal Constitution only if
they fall into one of the Smith exceptions.").
144 Pub. L. 106-274, § 1, 114 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc
to 2000cc-5 (2006)).
145 Id. Congress was very careful to stay within its constitutional powers. The
Supreme Court upheld this provision as constitutional in Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S.
709, 725 (2005).
146 Johnson, supra note 136, at 405.
147 Id. at 406-08.
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flicts. When conflicts arise outside of the prison setting, the holding
in Smith governs the claim of religious burden.
The sentence in Talty has the potential to burden convicted per-
sons whose religious beliefs include a prohibition on the use of birth
control.148 Whether the sentence would infringe on religious free-
dom depends on several factors. The first factor is whether the sen-
tence would qualify as a neutral law with respect to religion. In this
case, it appears that it would, as there is no indication that the sen-
tence was targeted to discriminate against any type of religious faith
and was not motivated by efforts to discriminate.
Second, the definition of reasonable must be expressed in order
to determine if the sentence would actually impinge on a religious
freedom. The court in Talty did not define reasonableness, and there
is no standard definition for the term in this situation, yet it appears
that the court meant for Mr. Talty to use some form of birth control.
Were the sentence to require outright that Mr. Talty use birth control,
the measure would clearly produce a burden on those persons whose
religion prevents them from complying; however, in this case, the
court left the term vague and undefined, thus allowing the proba-
tioner to choose a method of compliance. Under this arrangement,
all forms of compliance would have to imply a religious burden in
order for the provision to violate the Free Exercise Clause. This
would not appear to be the case under this restriction, as there
appears to be no religion that prohibits both birth control and absti-
nence.' 4 9 Although this sentence would surely be a burden, it does
not appear to be a religious one under the government-friendly stan-
dard of Smith.
B. The Hybrid Rights Exception
Despite the difficulty of prevailing in a claim of denial of free
exercise of religion, the right to religious freedom can still lead to
148 Mr. Talty never raised a religious objection to the sentence and there is no
indication that his faith prohibited the use of birth control. The idea of defining
reasonableness in terms of religion is purely academic at this point, but is an impor-
tant issue of freedom that might factor into future cases.
149 The case might change regarding married couples, as some religions mandate
that spouses are entitled to procreative sex as a condition of marriage. See, e.g.,
Charles J. Reid, Jr., Toward an Understanding of Medieval Universal Rights: The Marital
Rights of Non-Christians in Early Scholastic and Canonistic Writings, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV.
95, 96 n.2 (2005) (noting that in canon law the understanding of marriage rights was
considered to include a right to sexual relations); J.-R. Trahan, Successions & Dona-
tions, 64 LA. L. REv. 315, 326 n.23 (2004) (citing laws and scripture that describe the
duty to engage in sexual relations with one's spouse).
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more protection for Mr. Talty. The decision in Smith created a second
doctrine to deal with these types of claims, known as the hybrid rights
exception.150 The hybrid rights exception creates a higher level of
scrutiny in cases that involve the free exercise right combined with at
least one other constitutionally protected right; in such cases, two
rights which each warrant only heightened scrutiny will require strict
scrutiny (also known as the compelling interest standard) when they
are both implicated by the same situation.' 5 ' "Put simply, two losers
equal[ ] one winner." 5 2
One common situation in which the hybrid rights exception is
used to imply a higher scrutiny standard is in cases where parents are
fighting for "spiritual custody" of their child.' 53 In these cases, cus-
tody courts have held that the rights in the Free Exercise Clause and
the Due Process Clause add up to "a kind of case where . .. the whole
is greater than the sum of its constitutional parts." 54 Under this stan-
dard, the courts will only limit the power of the parent to determine
the child's religious affiliation "ifit appears that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens."'66 The exception and strict scrutiny have
become the norm in these cases, as all religious parenting cases are by
definition hybrid. 5 6 The landmark case in this area (and the one on
which the Smith opinion is based) is Wisconsin v. Yoder,15 7 in which
several Amish parents were convicted of failing to send their minor
children to school in violation of a Wisconsin statute.' 58 The Supreme
Court emphasized that keeping Amish children out of high schools
was important to both the Amish religious beliefs and the further exis-
tence of the Amish culture and religion as a whole; yet the Court over-
150 SeeJeffrey Shulman, WhatYoder Wrought: Religious Disparagement, Parental Alien-
ation and the Best Interests of the Child, 53 VILL. L. REv. 173, 174-77 (2008).
151 William L. Esser IV, Note, Religious Hybrids in the Lower Courts: Free Exercise Plus
or Constitutional Smoke Screen?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 211, 214 (1998).
152 Id. at 219.
153 Shulman, supra note 150, at 177.
154 Id.
155 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233-34 (1972); see also Shulman, supra note
150, at 177 (reiterating the hybrid situation in Yoder).
156 Shulman, supra note 150, at 177. It is important to note that this norm existed
before the decision in Smith. The Smith decision simply expanded this concept to
other general constitutional provisions. Id.; see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (listing potential hybrid rights cases involving other First Amend-
ment rights, before stating that no other rights were implied by the current situation
and that the exception did not fit).
157 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
158 Id. at 208-09.
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turned their convictions not on the basis of the free exercise right, but
on the basis of hybrid rights.15 9 The Court held that "when the inter-
ests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the
nature revealed by [the] record, more than merely a 'reasonable rela-
tion to some purpose within the competency of the State' is required
to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First
Amendment."160
The hybrid rights exception applies to more than just spiritual
custody cases. In the Smith decision, the Supreme Court listed several
examples of other rights that have been combined with the Free Exer-
cise Clause in order to meet this standard, including freedoms of
press, association, and speech.1 6 1 Despite the fact that the Court only
mentioned a few rights in the Smith case, "academics have almost uni-
versally accepted the [interpretation that other rights can be joined
with the freedom of religion] and attempted to use the hybrid excep-
tion as a means to expand free exercise protection as much as possi-
ble."162 Although there has been no settled definition, the majority of
courts, led by the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, require only that the
companion claims have "a colorable showing of infringement of rec-
ognized and specific constitutional rights" in order to trigger the
higher scrutiny.163
One of the rights that courts might allow in the hybrid rights
exception is the right to marriage.164 "[Uinder Smith, because mar-
riage is a fundamentally important right protected by the Due Process
Clause, it meets Justice Scalia's 'hybrid situation' test." 65 As the right
159 Id. at 216 (stating that this objection represents a "deep religious conviction").
160 Id. at 233 (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
161 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
162 -Esser, supra note 151, at 238.
163 Swanson v. Guthrie Ind. Sch. Dist., 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998).
164 Richard L. Elbert, Comment, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and the
Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1171, 1219 (1995) ("[E]ven under
Smith, a challenge to the marriage penalty involves a 'hybrid' situation such that strict
scrutiny would be appropriate.").
165 Keith E. Sealing, Polygamists Out of the Closet: Statutory and State Constitutional
Prohibitions Against Polygamy Are Unconstitutional Under the Free Exercise Clause, 17 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 691, 737 (2001) (using the exception to promote the legalization of polyg-
amy for religions which support the practice); see also Mark Strasser, Marriage, Free
Exercise, and the Constitution, 26 LAw & INEQ. 59, 87 (2008) ("Thus, even under Smith,
many polygamy bans would be appropriately subjected to strict scrutiny."); cf Ariel Y.
Graff, Free Exercise and Hybrid Rights: An Alternative Perspective on the Constitutionality of
Same-Sex Marriage Bans, 29 U. HAWv. L. REv. 23, 43-57 (2006) (concluding that relig-
ious exemptions from same-sex marriage bans are required under a hybrid rights
analysis).
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to marriage is clearly fundamental16 6 and often considered a central
part of religion, it follows logically that any law that unnecessarily
interferes with the freedom to be married and to follow the religious
tenets of the institution of marriage would have to be based on a com-
pelling reason.16 7
In the case of the Talty sentence, the Court's restriction on his
fundamental right to control the activities of his marriage might fall
under the hybrid rights exception. As court-imposed birth control
could be seen as an intrusion into a religious institution and a funda-
mental right, the sentence would require a compelling reason to pre-
vent reversal by a reviewing court. Although the reason given for the
sentence in this case is legitimate, it is not likely to be considered com-
pelling and the sentence would likely be overturned. It is important
to note that in order to assert this defense, a person in Mr. Talty's
position would have to show a sincere belief in a religion banning
birth control and that such a tenet of the religion is central;168 this
qualification cuts down dramatically on the number of people who
might use this defense.
CONCLUSION
Despite what many people initially expect (and what I expected),
it does not appear from the case law that convicted criminals are pro-
tected from government restriction on their procreative rights alone.
The government has tremendous power to control even the most inti-
mate aspects of a probationer's life, provided that such a restriction is
reasonably related to the crime committed, the probationer's rehabili-
tation, and prevention of a future occurrence of that crime.169 While
this allows for great intrusion, it is hardly carte blanche. The limita-
tions cannot be permanent and must have a reasonable justification
specific to the offender and the offense behind them, which is far
more than can be said for the eugenics movement.17 0
The only right that can trump the imposition of this type of sen-
tence outright is the right to free exercise of religion in combination
with the fundamental right to marry. This unexpected conclusion
comes primarily from the flexibility built into the Talty sentence's
"reasonable efforts" requirement. Reasonableness is in the eye of the
166 See discussion supra Part III.
167 Although it appears to fit the criteria necessary to trigger strict scrutiny, the
court has not addressed this issue directly.
168 See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972).
169 See supra notes 67-85 and accompanying text.
170 See discussion supra Part II.A.1.
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beholder, thus allowing the sentence to circumvent religious
problems. The imposition of a more specific sentence-such as no
sex at all or mandatory birth control-would not be able to pass con-
stitutional muster.
And what has become of Mr. Talty? Despite the fact that the pro-
creation restriction was lifted from his sentence, he was unable to stay
out of legal trouble. After the remand and resentencing, Mr. Talty
failed to report to his probation officer as mandated in the terms of
his release.17' As a result of this violation, he was sentenced to 180
days in jail. 172 His procreative rights were surely infringed by his
incarceration in the Medina County jail cell.
At the end of this analysis, we must ask whether enforcement of
these laws is worth giving the courts this much power over our private
lives. This question is a difficult one to answer; the criminally con-
victed would almost surely say no, while those who deserve and
depend on the support that the law mandates would almost surely say
yes. Ultimately, while this power is not inherently unjust, it must be
very closely monitored for abuse.
171 Probation Violation Judgment Entry at 2, State v. Talty, No. 02-CR-0075
(Medina County, Ohio Ct. Com. P1. May 19, 2006).
172 Id.
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